Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 1 Internalism	and	Prudential	Value Jennifer	Hawkins Many philosophers accept that prudential value is a distinct type of value, different	both	from	moral	value	and	also	from	general	non-moral	goodness.1	Those who	(like	myself)	accept the	category	of	prudential	value	think	of it	as the	type	of value at stake when we say that something is non-morally good for a particular person.	It	is	the	kind	of	value	theories	of	welfare	or	well-being	are	about.	It	is	what we	seek	for	ourselves	on	those	occasions	when	we	seek	our	own	self-interest.	And	it is	the	kind	of	value	we	seek	to	realize	for	others	when	we	try	to	benefit	them.	There are	many interesting	and (relatively)	underexplored foundational	questions	about prudential value. This paper is concerned with whether or not some form of existence internalism	(defined	below)	holds for	prudential	value,	and if so	what it amounts	to.2 Existence internalism is the idea that there is a necessary connection between	something's	having	a	certain	positive	normative	status	(its	being	right	or its being intrinsically prudentially good) and its ability to elicit positive psychological responses from human subjects.3	Existence internalism is typically contrasted with judgment internalism, which is a claim about what follows, as a matter of conceptual content, from sincere judgments about value.4 Existence internalism,	however,	is	a	metaphysical	thesis,	not	a	conceptual	one. 1	Philosophers	differ	in	how	they	carve	up	value.	For	example,	Moore	(1903)	and	Scanlon	(1998)	are skeptical of the very idea	of prudential value that is relative to individuals.	However, they are	not skeptical	of	the	idea	of	general,	non-relational	non-moral	goodness.	Others	who	discuss	general,	nonrelational goodness take the notion of intrinsic goodness to be primarily a moral notion (Zimmerman,	2015). 2	The idea that	some form	of internalism	must	hold for	prudential	welfare is commonly	expressed, but there	are relatively few	explicit	discussions	of	what such	a constraint	might amount to.	At the time this essay was written in 2014, the main discussions of prudential internalism were Rosati (1996),	Velleman	(2000),	Rosati	(1996),	and	Sarch	(2011).	Since	then	there	have	been	several	new additions	to	the	literature.	See	in	particular	Dorsey	(2017)	and	Heathwood	(ms.). 3	The term 'existence internalism' and its close relative 'judgment internalism' come from	Darwall (1983:	54). A	similar	distinction	with	different	labels	occurs	in	Brink	(1989:	40). 4 Smith (1994) defends moral judgment internalism. For detailed surveys of the many forms metaethical	internalism	can	take	and	the	relevance	for	particular	debates	see,	Van	Roojen	(2015)	and Rosati	(2016). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 2 Put another way, it is the claim that facts about human psychological responsiveness	constrain the	metaphysics	of	value in	particular	ways.	Attempts to specify existence internalism for a particular domain	of value are attempts to say what the metaphysical constraints are for that type of value. Peter Railton characterizes the task in terms of avoiding "alienness." He writes, "What is intrinsicially	valuable	for	a	person	must	have	a	connection	with	what	he	would	find to some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational or aware. It would	be	an intolerably	alienated	conception	of	someone's	good	to imagine	that it might	fail in	any	such	way	to	engage	him."5	However,	there	remain	different	views about	what	would	suffice	to	avoid	alienness.	My	aim	is	to introduce	and	defend	as viable	a	new	account	of	what	such	constraints	might	look	like. Moral existence internalism is typically formulated as a claim about motivation.	This	reveals	an	important	sense	in	which	discussions	of	prudential	value differ significantly from discussions of moral value. In the moral case, we are typically invited to imagine an agent who has the opportunity to act rightly or wrongly.	The	question	is	whether	the	moral	facts	are	such	that	her	mere	awareness of them	would give her (at least some, perhaps defeasible) motivation to do the right thing. But this scenario is prospective. Talk of motivation	makes sense only when action is required, and action is only sometimes required in relation to prudential	value.	Sometimes	we	are	in	pursuit	of	the	good.	But	at	other	times	we	talk about goodness that is realized, and here talk of motivation seems out of place. When we talk about goods that a person 'has' or 'possesses' we need different language. Rather than speak of	motivation	we speak of caring about the good or appreciating	the	good	or	some	other	contemporaneous	positive	response. Several theorists have recognized that when	we theorize about prudential value	we	need	a	broader	psychological	notion than just	motivation.6	However, this issue of terminology points to something with more than merely terminological significance. It points to a	modal distinction between types of prudential facts-a distinction	between	goodness	that	is	currently	realized	and	goodness	that	is	merely 5	Railton	(1986a). 6	In	addition	to	Rosati	(1996)	see	Velleman	(2000),	Heathwood	(ms.),	and	Dorsey	(2017). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 3 possible;	although	no	one	has	made	much	of	this	modal	distinction,	I	will	do	so	here. In	what follows, I defend the idea that	prudential existence internalism	should	be understood	simply	as	a	constraint	on	facts	about	realized	goodness.	In	those	cases where	talk	of	motivation	might	make	sense-cases	involving	possible	good-I	argue that	we	should	be	motivational	externalists. In	Section	5.1,	I	first	briefly	describe	what	I	call	"the	structure	of	good."	The aim	is	simply	to	make	explicit	the	important	relationships	between	different	kinds of	goodness	claims.	In	Section	5.2,	I	then	introduce	and	defend	the	coherence	of	my particular	version	of	internalism.	I	don't	pretend	to	offer	a	direct	argument	for	the plausibility	of	prudential	existence	internalism	itself.7	Instead,	since	many	theorists of well-being accept internalism, I aim to demonstrate the coherence and plausibility of a	particular	way	of formulating existence internalism for prudential value. In Section	5.3, I examine the	most influential alternative formulation	of the internalism	constraint,	Rosati's two-tier internalism,	and	argue that	my	account is preferable	to	hers. §1. The	Structure	of	Good Ordinary talk about	what is or	would be good for a person is usually talk about prudential goods. We seek to realize various kinds of intrinsic prudential goods in	our lives. I adopt an	understanding	of intrinsic value as final value, such that	its	natural	opposite	is	instrumental	value.8	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the word	'intrinsic,'	when	used	to	signal	final	value,	could	also	apply	to	the	kind	of	value 7	Some	theorists	do	argue	for	it.	See	Rosati	(1996),	Velleman	(2000)	and	Dorsey	(2017).	Sarch	(2011) offers	important	criticisms	of	the	arguments	in	Velleman	and	Rosati.	Dorsey	(2017)	argues	that	we should	not	accept	prudential	existence	internalism	simply	because	we	find	it	highly	intuitive.	There are,	he	claims,	far	too	many	intuitions	that	pull	in	the	opposite	direction	as	well,	such	that	we	must have	some	substantive	reason	for	holding	onto	internalism.	I	think	he	overstates	his	point,	however. Those who find internalism compelling rarely find the alleged counterexamples to internalism compelling	as	well.	Rather	this	is	one	of	the	places	in	philosophy	where	(sadly)	intuitions	seem	to	fall on	different	sides	of	a	seemingly	unbridgeable	divide. 8	See	Korsgaard	(1983)	and	Kagan	(1998).	Intrinsic	value	can	refer	either	to	the	value	something	has based	only	on its intrinsic	properties (the	contrast is	extrinsic	value),	or it can	refer to the	kind	of value	something	has	when	we	value	it	for	itself,	as	a	final	end	(the	contrast	being	instrumental	value). Kagan defends the coherence of retaining the label "intrinsic value" for the concept of final value, which	is	the	approach	I	adopt.	For	more	about	the	concept	of	intrinsic	value	see	Zimmerman	(2015). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 4 had	by	a	good	life.9	Here,	I	only	use	the	word	for	prudentially	valuable	items	within a	life.	Furthermore,	I	take	no	stance	here	on	what	kinds	of	things	may	count	as	basic intrinsic	prudential	goods.	Everything	I	say	can	be	adapted	(sometimes	with	a	little tweaking	of	my	examples)	to	the	full	range	of	views	about	prudential	goods. Basic,	intrinsic,	prudential	goods	are	good	for	us	at	a	specific	time	or	times.10 If	riding	a	bicycle	is	intrinsically	good	for	me,	then,	plausibly,	it	is	good	for	me	while	I am riding. Some goods are temporally brief; others last most of a lifetime. It is important to mark a distinction between goods that are currently realized for a person (currently adding value to her life) and goods that could be realized (depending on how things go). We must constantly be aware of the modal distinction	between	realized	good	and	possible	good. Because	I	maintain	that	prudential	goods	are	the	building	blocks	of	life	value, my view is unabashedly additive.	What	makes a life good are the goods in it. Of course,	some	theorists	reject	additive	views.11	However,	I	suspect	that	many	people are	suspicious	of	additive	accounts	because	they	focus	on	rather	simple	versions	of additivism. For	additivists	like	myself,	talk	of	a	good	life	depends	on	the	notion	of	overall value,	or	net	value.	Importantly,	a	life	can	be	said	to	be	good	in	two	distinct	ways.12 In	one	sense,	a	life	is	good	if	it	has	net	positive	value,	if	the	intrinsic	goods	in	that	life outweigh	the	intrinsic	bads,	even	if	only	by	a	little.	Something	like	this	seems	to	be what	(some)	philosophers	have	in	mind	when	they	talk	about	"a life	worth	living." However,	a	different	sense	of	good	captures	the	sense	in	which	we	all	aspire	to	have a	good	life.	A	good	life	in	this	sense	is	one	that	satisfies	a	high	threshold.	It	is	a	life 9	This	point	is	made	by	Feldman	(2000). 10	Not	everyone	will	agree	that	goods	must	be	realized	at	determinate	times	(e.g.	Nagel,	1970).	I argue	for	the	idea	that	prudential	goods	must	be	realized	at	particular	times	in	Hawkins	(2014). 11	A certain sub-set of theorists reject additive views	because they take seriously the idea that the shape	of	a	life	matters	prudentially.	They	tend	to	assume	that	this	rules	out	additivity	(or	as	some	say "intra-life aggregation"). See e.g. Slote (1984), Velleman (1991), Temkin (2012), Glasgow (2013). Dorsey	(2015)	demonstrates	that,	depending	on	why	you	think	shape	matters,	taking	shape	seriously may be compatible with aggregation. I am more willing than many to simply downplay the importance	of	shape	of	life	considerations.	On	this	see	Hawkins	(2014). 12	I find	it intuitive	to	distinguish	(as	I	do	in	the	text)	between	a	minimal	sense	of	good	and	a	more robust, aspirational sense that depends on a high threshold. However, sometimes the two are collapsed.	For	example,	Sidgwick	(1907)	equates	welfare	with	happiness	and	defines	happiness	as	a "surplus	of	pleasure	over	pain." Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 5 that	has	a	fair	amount	of	net	positive	value. It is	something	to	aim	at.	Lives	like	this are	"better	than	most." Insofar	as	we	exercise	agency	in	pursuit	of	our	good,	what	concerns	us	most are	good	choices.	To	understand	choices,	we	must	consider	the	structure	of	possible future	good.	For	any	given	individual	there	are	many	possible	continuations	of	her life.	What counts	as the	best continuation	depends	on	what the set	of	possibilities are. The best continuation is the one with the greatest net value. However, it is important to remember that the best continuation of a life (which means 'best' relative	to the	options)	may	not	be	good in	either	of the	senses	sketched	above: it may	not	have	positive	net	value,	and	it	may	not	be	good	in	the	aspirational	sense	of	a life	"better	than	most." The	best choice for	an individual	at	a time is the	one that	moves	her in the direction of realizing the best continuation of her life. A good choice is one that moves her towards one of the better continuations in the set of possible continuations. In ordinary speech, evaluations of choices and outcomes often get blurred.	For	example,	we	are	often	reluctant	to	call	a	choice	good	if	the	outcome	it produces is	not	(even	though it leads	to the least	worst	outcome).	And	sometimes we call a choice good if it helps us to realize something good immediately, even though the further consequences of the choice are not good. In what follows, however,	I	stick	to	the	use	of	"good	choice"	defined	here. Sometimes realizing a good continuation of a life requires the subject to make	dramatic	changes-changes	of	direction	or	goal.	It	may	require	new	skills	or training.	It	may	even	require	changing	aspects	of	herself.	This	is	important,	because goodness facts that lie	on the	other side	of great change	are the	hardest for	us to "see." It could thus	be true	of	an individual that the	best choice for	her is	one	she does	not	recognize	as	good	at	all.	Like	intrinsic	prudential	goods,	choices	have	value at	a	time.	But	their	value	is	instrumental,	depending	on	how	the	choice	relates	to	the possibilities	the	subject	confronts. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 6 §2.	Existence	Internalism	and	Prudential	Value Let us now consider potential internalist constraints on goodness facts. Recall that existence internalism is the claim that there is a necessary connection between,	on	the	one	hand,	normative	facts	(in	this	case	prudential	facts)	and	on	the other	hand,	human	psychological	responses.	What	might	this	connection	be? In the case of prudential value there is a rather simple suggestion	one can make.	Unsurprisingly,	being	simple	it	has	problems.	However,	these	are	more	easily dealt	with	than	typically	supposed.	I	shall	consider	and	respond	to	these	problems along	the	way,	some	in	this	section	and	some	later.	But	for	the	moment,	reflection	on the	simple	suggestion	is	a	good	way	to	start. What I call the simple suggestion is best brought out through examples.13 Imagine a	woman	named	Samia	who is a	newspaper	writer.	Various	people claim that	being	a	writer	is	intrinsically	good	for	Samia.	They	mean	that	it	is	good	for	her now,	not	that	it	will	be	good	for	her	at	some	point	in	the	future,	nor	that	it	would	be good	for	her	if	only	she	were	different	in	some	way.	Because	they	mean	it	is	good	for her now-as she is-they are making a claim about realized intrinsic prudential goodness. As	we	learn	more	about	her	case,	the	facts	cast	doubt	on	their	claim.	First,	we discover	that	writing	and	the	writing	life	do	not	give	Samia	any	pleasure.14	Next,	we consider whether it makes her happy. After all, people can sometimes be made happy	by	activities	or	projects	that	they	would	not	exactly	describe	as	pleasurable. But the evidence suggests that Samia is not happy. Writing leaves her feeling depressed	and	drained.	Sometimes	people	pursue	things	they	value	even	though	the pursuit doesn't fit their affective profile very	well. In such cases, despite how the pursuit makes them feel, they think the thing they are pursuing has value. It is because they value it that they persevere. But Samia doesn't value	writing either. She	doesn't	think	it	is	important	in	its	own	right.	In	fact,	she	doesn't	see	any	value	in 13	The	following	example	presupposes	a	non-mental	state	theory	of	welfare	since	the	activity	of writing	is	being	considered	as	a	candidate	for	intrinsic	goodness.	Nothing	much	turns	on	this	as	I	hope will	be	clear	by	the	end.	But	a	concrete	example	has	to	make	some	sort	of	assumption	about	welfare. 14	Even	non-hedonists	may	think	that	pleasure	is	a	sign	of	the	presence	of	value. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 7 it	at	all.	For	whatever	reason,	it	is	just	the	job	she	has	right	now	and	she	has	to	do	it to	make	a	living. At	this	point	it	becomes	incredibly	hard	to	believe	that	writing	is	intrinsically good for Samia. This suggests a general type of necessary condition on realized intrinsic	goodness.	Call	this	the	simple	constraint	(SC): SC: A	necessary	condition	on	something	X	being	a	basic	intrinsic	prudential	good	for a	subject,	S,	at	a	time	T,	is	that	S	must	have	some	kind	of	positive	response	to	X	at	T. Here, I intend	positive response to	be construed	quite	broadly to include	positive sensations, feelings, affective states, and positive evaluative attitudes.15	However, positive responses must be psychological and at least partly conscious. It is also important to note that the condition is framed as necessary, but it says nothing about	the	sufficiency	conditions	for	good. One	problem	with	SC	emerges	quickly.	It	has	to	do	with	our	understanding	of 'response'	and	whether it is flexible	enough	to	cover	cases	of temporally	extended value	and	the	attitudes	that	ground	such	value.	Suppose	(unlike	a	hedonist)	I	think that	relationships	can	have	intrinsic	prudential	value.	A	relationship	might	last	for	a long time	and	have	value for	me	during	all of that time.	But	presumably I am	not having a positive response to this relationship (or the person I am related to) at each	of	the	times	when	(intuitively)	it	is	good	for	me.	What	seems	likely	is	that	the relationship	becomes	good	when	I	first	develop	a	certain	attitude	of	valuing	towards it.	But	this	attitude	will	not	be	at	the	forefront	of	awareness	from	then	on. Of	course	there	is	a	sense	in	which,	all	through	that	time,	I	'have'	the	valuing attitude.	This	is	a	dispositional	sense.	Most	beliefs	and	evaluative	attitudes	require	a dispositional	analysis.	For	years	I	have	had	a	belief	about	where	I	was	born.	If	you ask	me if I was born there I	will say yes. But I hardly ever think about this fact, 15	My intention is to be as broad as possible	within the range of positively valenced psychological reactions. Heathwood (ms.) similarly argues for the need to define the psychological side of an internalist	constraint	broadly.	We	thus	differ	from	Dorsey	(2017)	who	defines	the	constraint	in	terms of	valuing	attitudes. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 8 despite believing it. Only rarely does this content rise to the level of occurrent thought. Evaluative	attitudes	are	more	complex	than	ordinary	non-evaluative	beliefs. It might call into doubt my valuing of X if I rarely thought about X. If I value X, occurrent	positive	thoughts	about	X	must	occur,	at	least	periodically.	Moreover,	if	X is	something	(or	someone) I interact	with	regularly,	one	would	expect	me	to	have various	kinds	of	positive	response	to	X	on	a	regular	basis.	It	was	(at	least	in	part)	the absence of such regular, positive responses to writing that raised doubts about Samia. It is, of course, entirely unclear how	many responses are required or how often	they	must	occur.	But the	details	need	not	concern	us	here	as long	as	we	can agree that it is too	strong to say that	positive response	must	be	constant, and too weak to require that positive response only occur once. I suggest we talk about valuing and other on-going positive attitudes as 'positive engagements,' in recognition of the fact that such attitudes, though dispositional, will with some regularity	become	manifest	in	occurrent	positive	responses.	Then	we	can	make	the following	amendment: SC2:	A	necessary	requirement	on	X's	being	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good	for	S	at T	is	that	S	must	either	have	a	positive	response	to	X	at	T,	or	S	must	have	an	on-going positive	engagement	with	X	that	still	holds	at	T. However,	a	second	problem	follows	quickly	in	the	wake	of	the	first.	For	SC2 seems to require that all good things enter the awareness of a subject. Most contemporary	theorists	of	welfare	reject	what	James	Griffin	labeled	"the	experience requirement," the idea that prudential goodness (or badness) must enter our experience or our awareness.16	They insist that intrinsic prudential value can be realized even when the subject is ignorant of this. The most straightforward example of theories that allow this are traditional versions of desire fulfillment 16	Griffin	(1986). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 9 theory	that	allow	that	the	satisfaction	of	a	desire	(an	event	in	the	world)	is	good	for a	person	even	if	she	doesn't	ever	know	it	has	been	satisfied. This	is	a	problem;	however,	it	is	important	to	keep	certain	goals	in	mind.	The aim	is	to	articulate	a	very	general	internalism	requirement	that	focuses	on	realized intrinsic	prudential	good.	Any	candidate	must	minimally	explain	our	intuitions	about cases	like	Samia.	But	we	can	accomplish	these	dual	goals	without	at	the	same	time building	in	an	experience	requirement.	We	just	change	SC2	to	SC3: SC3:	A	necessary	condition	on	something,	X,	being	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good for	a	subject,	S,	at	a	time	T,	is	that: (1) If	S	is	aware	of	X	at	T,	S	must	either	have	a	positive	response	to	X	at	T,	or	S must	have	an	on-going	positive	engagement	with	X	that	still	holds	at	T,	or (2) If S is unaware	of	X at	T, it	must	be true that S	would	have	had a	positive response	to	X	at	T	if	she	had	been	aware	of	X	at	T. This	formulation	leaves	room	for	the	possibility	that	something,	X,	might	be	good	for S	at	T,	even	though	S	does	not	respond	positively	to	it	then	because	S	knows	nothing about	it.	It	holds	onto	the	idea	(which	seems	key)	that	a	certain	kind	of	psychological relation must obtain between S and X at the very time X is good for S. What is relinquished is the idea that this relation	must involve a direct experience of the good	thing.	The	right	kind	of	psychological	relations	can	obtain	at	a	time	as	long	as certain psychological dispositions for response obtain at that time.17	It is also important that the counterfactual element here is	minimal. No appeal is	made to how	S	would respond to X in conditions extremely different from the ones she is currently in.	The	counterfactual	appeals	to	a	situation	exactly like	the	real	one	but for	one	difference:	S's	awareness	of	X.	Finally,	such	an	account	can	still	easily	handle the	more	ordinary	cases in	which	someone is aware	of	a	putative	good.	Writing is 17	The	current	framing	of	the	constraint	assumes	that	the	intrinsically	good	thing	must	be	the	object of	a	psychological	response.	As	will	become	clear	in	later	discussion,	I	also	allow	that	a	theorist	could modify SC slightly to include cases in	which the	psychological response is itself the intrinsic good. Heathwood	(ms.)	also	discusses	this. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 10 not good for Samia, since Samia clearly is aware of writing yet has no positive responses	to	it	and	no	ongoing	positive	engagement	with	it. Some theorists may still find SC3 problematic. Even though there is no requirement in	SC3 that	S	actually respond	positively to	X, there is	a requirement that S have certain response	dispositions toward X at T. Some theorists think that once	you	give	up	the	experience	requirement	there	is	no	reason	to	place	restrictions on the subject's psychology at the time when goodness is realized.18	But this is mistaken.	Without	some	such	requirement	it	is	far	too	easy	to	generate	bizarre	cases in	which a person is benefited at a time by something she	would (if she actually knew	about	it)	view	as	deeply	bad.	The	constraint	we	are	articulating	requires	(as	a necessary condition	only)	a	kind	of fit	between	current	psychological	outlook	and goodness	facts.	No	doubt	different	theorists	will	be	tempted	to	explain	in	different ways	why	such	fit	is	important.	But	whatever	explanation	one	gives,	it	is	hard	to	see why it	will not apply just as	well in the case	where the subject is ignorant of the putative	good. In	what follows, I	shall	continue	to	use	the	phrase	"simple	constraint"	but I will	now	take	it	to	refer	to	SC3. §2.1 Internalism	and	Theories	of	Welfare In	addition	to	whatever	surface	plausibility	the	simple	constraint	has,	it	gains some indirect support from the fact that many theorists of welfare, particularly those of a subjectivist bent, seem to be-at least implicitly-concerned with preserving	something	like	it. §2.1.1 Hedonism Consider first classical hedonism according to which pleasure is the only basic intrinsic good and pain the only basic intrinsic bad. One natural way of understanding	the	allure	of	hedonism	is	to	note	that	pleasure	is	a	mental	state	that is, when experienced, always welcomed, at least to some degree, by the person 18	Derek	Parfit	(1984:	495)	seems	to	suggest	this. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 11 whose	pleasure	it	is.	It	is,	of	course,	possible	to	have	mixed	reactions	to	pleasure.	I might	feel	pleasure,	but	because	I	think	my	feeling	pleasure	is	inappropriate,	I	might also	feel	shame,	or	embarrassment.	In	short,	I	can	both	feel	pleasure	at	a	time	(and when feeling it	welcome it) and yet at a different, higher level of	my psychology, adopt a disapproving attitude towards	my own pleasure and so desire not to be experiencing	it. I suggest	we think of this 'welcoming' response as an involuntary affective response,	one	that	operates	at	a	different	level	from	more	cognitively	sophisticated attitudes.	It	is	this	immediate,	low-level	reaction	to	pleasure-what	I	am	calling	the welcoming response-that seems to underwrite our sense that experiences of pleasure satisfy SC3.	Moreover, the	welcoming response is something	we reliably have	whenever	we	experience	pleasure,	and	it	lasts	only	for	as	long	as	the	pleasure lasts. Thus pleasure naturally and easily satisfies the simple constraint: for the hedonist,	pleasure	is	good	whenever	S	experiences	it,	and	whenever	S	experiences it,	S	has	a	positive	(welcoming)	response	to	it	at	that	time. Someone might object that whether or not pleasure satisfies the simple constraint	depends	on	the	nature	of	pleasure.19 There	is	something	to	this.	To	see why, consider two views-distinguished by L.W. Sumner-about the nature of pleasure.20	On internalist views, pleasure is simply a particular type of sensation. What	various	pleasures	have	in	common	is	"their	positive	feeling	tone:	an	intrinsic, unanalyzable	quality	of	pleasantness	that	is	present	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	in all	of	them."21	Externalist	views,	on	the	other	hand,	define	pleasure	in	terms	of	some attitude	or	response	that	an	agent	has	towards	a	sensation.	The	various	sensations might be quite diverse, but what makes them pleasures is the subject's attitude towards	them.22	I	find	it	helpful	to	think	of	such	theories	as	bundle	theories,	because 19	Guy Fletcher raised this objection when this paper was presented at the 2014 Metaethics Conference. Namely, he pointed out that hedonism plus an externalist account of pleasure would violate	SC3.	He	has	also	made	a	similar	point	in	Fletcher	(2013). 20	L.	W.	Sumner	(1996).	It	is	unfortunate	that	so	many	different	debates	in	philosophy	are	framed	in terms	of	the	labels	internalism/	externalism.	Here	the	terms	are	currently	being	used	in	the	service of	a	debate	about	the	nature	of	pleasure-a	debate	entirely	unrelated	to	the	metaethical	debate	that	is the	main	focus	of	the	paper. 21	Ibid,	88. 22	Heathwood	(2007)	is	a	contemporary	defense	of	an	externalist	view	of	pleasure. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 12 on such views pleasure is a bundle	with two elements: a sensation	and a certain kind	of	positive	response	to	that	sensation. Both internalists and externalists typically acknowledge the existence of positive	response	in	cases	of	pleasure.	They	differ	merely	in	whether	they	view	that response	as	a	reaction	to	pleasure,	or	as	a	part	of	pleasure. For	internalists	the	welcoming	response	is	a	response	to	a	sensation,	and	the sensation	is	pleasure.	Since	the	response	is	a	response	to	pleasure	and	it	is	pleasure that is claimed to be good, this neatly satisfies the simple constraint. But for externalists	the	welcoming	response	is	a	part	of	pleasure.	If	you	combine	this	view with	the	claim	that	pleasure	is	good,	the	view	in	question	will	not	satisfy	the	simple constraint.	The	simple	constraint	claims	that	something	can	only	be	good	when	the subject	has	a	positive	response	to	it,	and	that	would	require	a	welcoming	response (or	some	other	positive	response)	to	the	bundle	that	already	contains	a	welcoming response. In	short, if	we	accept the	simple	constraint, then in	order for	externalist pleasure to	count	as	good it	would	have	to	be true that	we	routinely	welcome	the thing	that	contains	welcoming.	This	is	implausible. How	problematic	is	this?	First,	it	is	important	to	note	that	it	doesn't	threaten my	central	claim	which	is	this:	at	least	part	of	the	attraction	of	hedonism	historically has	come from	the fact that theorists intuitively	wanted	to	capture	something like the	simple	constraint	and	thought	that	equating	goodness	facts	with	pleasure	was	a way to do this. Even if externalist theories are currently more popular with philosophers, historically many hedonists were internalists and others appear to have	been	confused	or	undecided	about	which	view	to	accept.23	Moreover,	I	suspect internalism	about	pleasure	is	the	naïve	view,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	the	one	most	of us begin with. But then, since internalism about pleasure is compatible with the simple constraint, my claim about the historical allure of hedonism may still be correct. Second,	the	problems	here	may	be	pretty	minor.	Clearly	it is	the	welcoming response	(whether	thought	of	as	part	of	pleasure	or	as	a	reaction	to	pleasure)	that 23	For a discussion of the different strands of thought running through the tradition see Sumner (1996:	87-91). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 13 underwrites	many	people's	sense	that	pleasure	is	good	for	the	one	who	experiences it (whether or not it is an all-things-considered good is a different	matter). Given that this is so, an	externalist about	pleasure could	make	several	moves. She could modify the simple constraint slightly. For example, a hedonist who is externalist about	pleasure	could	adopt	SC4,	which,	in	spirit,	is	not	so	different	from	the	earlier versions	of	SC: SC4: A necessary condition of X's being a basic, intrinsic prudential good for a subject,	S, at	T is that	X	be the	kind	of	mental state that	has	a	positive	welcoming response	built	into	it.24 Alternatively, the	externalist	could	simply	say	that	we	misspeak	when	we	say	that pleasure	is	what	has	intrinsic	value.	Rather	it	is	the	central	element	of	pleasure-the sensation at its core-that has value, and it has this in virtue of the fact that	we naturally welcome it. Finally, one might simply adopt an internalist account of pleasure.	After	all,	it	does	seem	much	more	natural	to	say	that	we	welcome	pleasure (as	opposed	to	saying	that	pleasure	is	partly	a	welcoming).25 Though	I	do	not	have	space	to	consider	other	theories	besides	hedonism	that focus	on	occurrent	attitudes	or	experiences,	it	should	be	obvious	that	many	of	them will	also	have	the	resources	to	satisfy	SC3. §2.1.2 Desire	Fulfillment	Theories Although	desire theories are	different from	hedonism,	desire theorists also seem	to	be	concerned	with	something	like	the	simple	constraint.26	The	evidence	for 24	A value pluralist who counts pleasure as one value among others could combine SC4 with the earlier	SC3	to	get	a	hybrid	principle. 25	For	recent,	more	sophisticated	internalist	views	of	pleasure	see	Crisp	(2006),	Smuts	(2011). 26	It is	sometimes	said	that	one	of	the	most intuitive	features	of	desire	theories is	that	they	(better than other theories) capture the internalist constraint. See e.g. Arneson (1999), Noggins (1999), Brink	(2008),	Dorsey	(2017).	However,	what	is	meant	is	not	that	desire	theories	preserve	something like the	constraint I	defend	here.	Rather such	comments	presuppose	an	entirely	different	vision	of what	prudential	internalism	amounts	to,	a	vision	I	think	we	should	reject	(see	my	arguments	against Rosati	below).	Although	the	features	of	desire	theory	commonly	thought	to	preserve	internalism	are not	my focus, I think	one	can trace in the	development	of	desire theory	an implicit	commitment to Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 14 this is indirect,	but	nonetheless	powerful.	Without trying to	name	all the	different desire	theories	or	go	into	their	details,	we	can	point	to	a	particular	direction	that	the development	of	such	views	has	taken	over	time,	one	that	is	suggestive	of	concerns about	positive	response	to	realized	basic	intrinsic	good. The	most	basic	form	of	desire	theory	claims	that	what	is	good	for	a	person	is for	her	actual	desires	to	be	satisfied.	It	is	the	desire	satisfaction-a	state	of	affairs	in the	world-that is the	bearer	of intrinsic	value.	The	mental	state 'desire' is	simply relevant	as	the	device	that	tells	us	which	states	of	affairs	benefit	which	people.	Only those	states	of	affairs	that	are	the	satisfaction	of	my	desires	benefit	me. What	matters	for	our	purposes	is	the	way	these	views	have	developed	over time.	Most	theorists	take	'desire'	to	be	a	prospective	attitude.27	I	desire	now	what	I shall	(perhaps)	get later. It is	this feature	of	desire	that	creates	problems	for	basic desire theories. It is usually assumed that the satisfaction of a desire benefits a person	at	the	time	the	desire	is	satisfied.	However,	a	person	might	desire	X	at	T,	but when	her	desire is satisfied	at	T2	and she is aware	of this, it	might	be that she is disappointed	in	X.	The	problem	isn't	just	that	she	is	unhappy.	Desire	theorists	pride themselves on being able to accommodate the fact that not everyone cares about happiness.	Some	individuals	do	quite	well	in	life	despite	having	little	happiness.	The issue is	not	happiness	per	se,	but	rather lack	of	any	kind	of	positive	response to the putative	good.	Not	only	does it	not	make	her	happy	or	give	her	pleasure,	but	now that	she	'has'	it	she	sees	no	value	in	it. This is just the same point made earlier: if something is supposedly intrinsically	good	for	a	person	at	a	time	(and	she	is	aware	of	this	thing)	we	expect there	to	be	some	kind	of	positive	response	to	the	good	thing	at	that	time.	Theorists something like my constraint. So far as I know, such a commitment has never been explicitly articulated	by	desire	theorists	or	labeled	by	them	as	internalism.	But	that	the	commitment	is	there	at all	strikes	me	as	highly	significant	and	telling. 27	Sumner (1996), p129. Heathwood (2006) bucks this trend, using 'desire' to name a concurrent attitude,	a	pro-attitude	towards	something	at	the	time	you	have	it.	He	thereby	becomes	immune	to the	particular	problem for	desire theories	outlined	here.	However, it is	doubtful that	his theory (a species	of	what	Parfit	(1984)	called	"preference	hedonism")	would	be	classified	as	a	form	of	desire theory.	Most	simple	desire	theories	do	face	the	problem. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 15 can differ about the type of response that matters, but if there is no positive response	at	all	we	cannot	sustain	the	thought	that	the	thing	really	is	good. Because there are so	many	ways that prospective desires can be defective and thus	so	many	ways that the	satisfaction	of	prospective	desires	can	disappoint us, simple desire theories have very few advocates. However, it is precisely the recognition	of	this	problem	as	a	problem	that	I	want	to	highlight,	because	theorists with	otherwise	quite	diverse	approaches	have	shared	this	intuition.	Desire	theorists themselves	have	tried	to	adjust	their	view	to	avoid	this	problem,	which	suggests	they accept that the counter-examples point to a real issue. This reflects an implicit acceptance	of	the	simple	constraint. In response, desire theorists have	moved to some type of informed desire theory. Some of these views are like the simple version in holding that the satisfaction of informed desires is of intrinsic value. But others depart from this somewhat.	Although	still	called	desire theories,	here	the idea is that	under	certain improved epistemic conditions a person would be able to act as her own best advisor.28	From the	better vantage	point she	would	be	able to 'see' the	prudential goodness facts, facts about goods but also facts about choices and lives. The individual's good is defined as what from this special epistemically advantaged position she	would	want for her actual self if she	were to contemplate her actual self's position as someone about to assume her actual self's position. 29 The advantaged self might want particular intrinsic goods for her actual self, but she might	also	want	her	actual	self	to	make	certain	choices	that	will	lead	(perhaps	only in	the	long-run)	to	intrinsic	goods. The problem with all such accounts is that it still seems possible that someone	might	get the thing	her informed	self	wants for	her	and	yet	not find	any value	in	it.	Alternatively,	she	might	make	the	choice	that	her	informed	self	wants	her to	make	and	persevere	in	this	direction,	yet	never	come	to	respond	positively	to	or see value in the things she thereby acquires. In the simpler case we find it implausible to suppose that a thing could be intrinsically good at a time	when a 28	Railton	(1986a;	1986b). 29	Railton	(1986b:	174). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 16 person	(who	is	aware	of	it)	sees	no	good	in	it.	In	the	slightly	more	complex	case,	we find	it	impossible	to	believe	that	a	choice	is	good,	unless	we	are	confident	that	it	will at	least	eventually	lead	to	encounters	with	things	we	respond	positively	to.	But	when we	have no confidence that continued	pursuit of a particular path	will eventually lead	to	positive	response	of	some	form,	we	find	it	impossible	to	view	the	case	as	one where an individual is proceeding down a path towards something good for her. Even when the ideal epistemic conditions are described as incorporating full information and full rationality, philosophers continue to have doubts about whether such cases (cases in which the actual self finds no value in the things selected	for	her	by	the	ideal	self)	will	be	eliminated.30	In	other	words,	the	difference that	remains	between	theorists	who	accept	full information	accounts	of	prudential good	and	theorists	who	don't	does	not	appear	to	be	a	disagreement	about	whether	a theory	should	satisfy	SC3	but	instead	looks	like	a	disagreement	about	whether	that particular	theory	in	fact	satisfies	SC3.	Both	parties	seem	committed	to	the	idea	that the	theory	would	fail	if	it	failed	to	satisfy	the	simple	constraint. §2.1.3 Objective	List	Theories Objective list theories are traditionally thought of as those theories that reject	the	necessity	of	any	kind	of	psychological	response.	Although	this	means	that most	of	them	fail	to	satisfy	SC3,	this	is	hardly	damning	since	most	of	them	explicitly reject	any	form	of	existence	internalism.	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	a	number of	theorists	have	recently	tried	to	amend	this	very	feature	of	objective	list	theories, recognizing it as the	most problematic part of the view. As Shelly Kagan puts it, "Friends	of	an	objective	account	of	well-being	seem	forced	to	accept	the	unappealing claim that I could be extremely well-off, provided that I have the right objective goods	in	my	life,	even	though	these	things	hold	no	appeal	for	me,	and	I	am,	in	fact, utterly	miserable."31	It is	precisely the	un-attractiveness	of such	a claim that leads Kagan (as well as a number of other theorists interested in objective views)32	to 30	Sobel	(1994),	Rosati	(1995). 31	Kagan	(2009:	254). 32	For	example,	Adams	(1999);	Darwall	(2002). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 17 consider a modified version according to which objective goods can improve a person's	life	only	if	he	or	she	has	positive	attitudes	towards	them.	On	Kagan's	view	a person	must	enjoy	the	objective	goods.	Of	course	it	is	not	at	all	clear	whether	these theorists would be willing to distinguish between realized good and merely potential	good	and	so	not	clear	whether	they	would	embrace	the	simple	constraint. But	the	quote	from	Kagan	certainly	does	seem	to	suggest	the	simple	constraint.	For it emphasizes the extreme implausibility of "having" or "possessing" an intrinsic good	at	the	very	time	it	makes	you	miserable. §2.2 Further	Objections Despite	its	initial	plausibility,	many	theorists	continue	to	worry	about	certain putative counter-examples to SC3. These challenge the necessity of positive response	(or	positive	engagement)	in	cases	where	the	subject	clearly	has	knowledge or	awareness	of	the	putative	intrinsic	good. A common case is one	where a person is in the process of acquiring some new	skill	or	transitioning	into	some	new	set	of	circumstances.	For	example,	consider Maria	who, unlike Samia, has the talent to become an excellent	writer and	would thrive	as	one	if	she	could	just	get	through	the	excruciating	first	years.	Surely	(says the	objector)	it	is	good	for	Maria	to	keep	going	despite	the	fact	that	currently	she	has no	positive	response?	Yes.	However,	the	sense	in	which	it	is	good	for	her	to	do	this	is instrumental.	It	is	a	good	choice	to	persevere	because	genuine	intrinsic	goods	lie	in wait	for	her	if	she	sticks	with	it	and	acquires	the	skill. A	different	case	raises	more	serious	concerns.	Consider	someone	in	a	severe clinical depression.	He is so	depressed	he	does	not currently	have the capacity to respond positively to anything. He feels no pleasure. He is not happy. He values nothing. His family is loving and supportive and is trying to get him into a good treatment program. Surely (says the objector) it is good for him to go into treatment? Surely the love and support of his family are good for him even now, while	he	cannot	appreciate	their	efforts?	The	simple	constraint	seems	to	imply	that nothing is intrinsically	good for this	person	right	now.	But (so the	objection	goes) that	can't	be	right. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 18 First,	it	is	important	to	notice	that	the	case	goes	beyond	clinical	reality	(and so	may never actually be instantiated). People who are severely depressed often cannot feel	much	pleasure.	And	they	often	value far	less than	they	did	beforehand. But	it	is	not	clear	that	there	really	are	people	who	remain	self-aware	and	yet	have	no capacity	to	respond	positively	to	anything	at	all. Yet there are people whose capacities for positive response are severely limited. So the	question remains,	what is good for them?	The answer	depends	on thinking about the structure of good. Certain kinds of claims involving 'good' are true	of	this	individual. If	the	person	is	treatable,	then	there	exist	possible	continuations	of	her	life	in which she could realize many basic, intrinsic prudential goods that she cannot realize	now.	Assuming	that	some	of these	possible life	continuations	are	ones that contain	net	positive intrinsic	value, she	has	a	normative	prudential reason	now	to try	and	bring	about	one	of these.	Whether	or	not she realizes it, she	has	a reason now	to	try	and	end	her	depression.	Mostly	likely	she	doesn't	realize	it.	But	it	is	also true that those	who love her have reason now to help her out of depression and should	do	so	precisely	because	she	can't	appreciate	her	own	situation. My	account does	say	that	very	few	things	count	as	basic	intrinsic	prudential	goods	for	her	at	this point	in	time.	But	this	seems	right.	Indeed,	it	is	part	of	the	explanation	of	the	badness of	depression	that	it	narrows	our	evaluative	connections	to	the	world	in	this	way.	It undermines	us	as	valuers	and	as	responders. Some	people,	however,	are	still	not	satisfied.	Surely,	they	argue,	the	love	and support	of	the	family	is	intrinsically	good	now?	It	is	not	clear	to	me	why	we	should want	to	say	this.	If	she	currently	has	no	ability	to	respond	positively	to	support	and cannot maintain positive engagement with those who love her, it seems that currently the love	and	support is	quite literally	not	benefiting	her.	And	because	of this, it fails to	be intrinsically good for	her	now. This is compatible	with the claim that	there	are	strong	reasons	now	for	providing	love	and	support.	It	may	lead	to	the individual	getting	the	right	help.	The	love	and	support	may	also	be	good	in	the	sense that	it	is	good	to	keep	trying	to	engage	someone	who	is	depressed.	You	never	know when your expressions of love	might "get through." Finally, some theorists	might Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 19 wish to say that loving another person is a (morally) good thing for the one	who loves	or	that	it is just	non-relationally	good-good	simpliciter-that	there	be	more love	in	the	world.	All	of	this	is	compatible	with	recognizing	that	the	love	and	support is	not	intrinsically	good	for	the	depressed	person	while	she	is	so	deeply	depressed. §3 Motivation	to	Pursue	the	Good? So	far	I	have	focused	entirely	on	one	type	of	constraint,	a	constraint	on	truths about	realized	good	of	the	form: "X	is	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good	for	S	now." But	what	about	potential	good?	What	about	truths	of	the	form: "Y	would	be	good	for	S" ? Should	such	truths	motivate	agents	in	the	way	that	some	philosophers	think	moral truths	should	motivate	individuals	to	act	rightly? We need several clarifications before we can answer. To begin with, the sentence "Y would be good for S" is ambiguous. 'Y' could refer to some putative intrinsic	good	or	to	a	choice.	Moreover,	it	could	be	true	that	something-perhaps	a particular relationship-would be intrinsically good for a subject S, but still false that	she	ought	to	pursue	it.	For	it	might	also	be	true	that	the	relationship	(which	is	a good) is part of a path through life that is not as good overall. Even if the relationship	is	intrinsically	good,	if	it	is	not	part	of	one	of	the	good	continuations	of S's	life,	then	it is	not	a	good	choice.	So	if	we	want	to	consider	issues	of	motivation, we should focus	on true claims	about good choices. If any	prudential facts should motivate	individuals	to	act,	surely	it	would	be	these. Are	all	subjects	such	that	if	they	are	minimally	rational	and	confronted	with such	facts	they	will	be	(at	least	somewhat)	motivated?	The	right	answer,	I	think,	is: Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 20 no. 33 When it comes to merely potential good, we should be motivational externalists.	To	see	why,	we	first	need	some	clarity	about	what is	at	stake.	We	are interested in existence internalism, which is a	metaphysical thesis. It is easy to confuse intuitions in this realm with intuitions about judgment internalism. Judgment internalism holds that there is a necessary connection between sincere judgment involving evaluative concepts and	motivation. For all I know, judgment internalism	may	be	true	for	prudential	good.	Perhaps	the	notion	of	prudential	good is	such	that	if	you	genuinely	believe	Y	is	the	best	choice	for	you,	you	will	necessarily have some motivation to choose Y. I take no stand on that. But notice that if judgment internalism	is	true,	people	will	be	motivated	by	anything	they	believe	to be	good,	whether	or	not	it	really	is	good. Existence internalism, on the other hand, is concerned with the relation between normative facts naturalistically construed, on the one hand, and human responsiveness.	on	the	other.	Theorists	who	want	to	capture	some	form	of	existence internalism	tend	to	equate	prudential	value	facts	with	facts	they	think	most	people care	about.	Most	people	care	about	their	happiness,	even	if	that	is	not	all	they	care about. Because of this some theorists have hoped to secure the right kind of internalist connection by equating prudential value facts with facts about what would	make	someone	happy.	Indeed,	the	constraint	would	work	if	we	could	be	sure that everyone is always, at least to some degree, motivated by facts about what would make them happy. But this is not the case. Nor am I aware of any other candidate set of goodness facts that people are reliably motivated to pursue, independently	of	their	evaluative	beliefs	about	prudential	good. In short, to test existence internalism	we	have to imagine a subject	who is considering	a	choice	that,	according	to	our	favored	theory,	is	good	for	her.	She	need not	think	of	the	choice	or	its	outcome	as	good,	but	she	must	have	correct	descriptive beliefs	about	what	her	life	would	have	in	it	if	she	made	the	choice	and	what	her	life 33	Many theorists incline towards 'yes.' Rosati (1996) defends an indirect form of motivational internalism.	Tiberius	and	Hall (2016)	assume the truth	of	motivational internalism,	and	argue that one point in favor of subject-dependent theories is that they are	well placed to explain this truth. However, it should now be clear that not all subject-dependent theories actually preserve motivational	internalism	about	potential	good. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 21 would	be	like	for	her	at	various	points	in	the	future	if	she	made	it.	The	question	is whether we can identify any plausible potential goodness facts that we can be certain	she	will	motivated	by.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	we	can. If I	am	right, then	we	should	be	motivational	externalists	when it comes to unrealized,	merely	potential	good.	Of	course,	even	externalists	can	allow	that	people are sometimes	motivated by such facts.	What they deny is that such	motivational connections are necessary. And that seems right, particularly once we get clear about the structure of good.	Recall that sometimes it can	be good for a person to change	her	circumstances	or	herself	dramatically.	It	is	highly	plausible	that,	at	least once in	a	while, the	best	path	forward	through	life for	an individual	will	be	one	of the	paths	that	requires	dramatic	self	change.	But	then	our	theory	will	say	dramatic change is the best choice. And in these kinds of cases, even if we have great confidence in our theory, we simply cannot guarantee that such facts will have motivational	force	for	the	agents. To	help	make	clear	that	the	problem	is	not	specific	to	a	particular	theory,	I'll consider	two	examples.	For	the	first	I	will	assume	the	truth	of	hedonism,	and	for	the second	the	truth	of	some	form	of	value	pluralism. Consider	Miserable	Maud,	a	religious	ascetic.34	She	believes	pleasures	come from	the	devil	and	must	be	avoided	as	much	as	possible.	She	lives	her	life	in	a	way that pretty successfully minimizes pleasure. But Maud is certainly capable of experiencing pleasure and sometimes despite herself she experiences some. According to hedonism the best path forward for Maud is one that leads her to experience	a	great	deal	of	pleasure.	However,	Maud	is	unlikely	to	embark	on	such	a path	without	a	dramatic	change	in	her	outlook,	since	her	current	attitudes	lead	her to avoid pleasurable things and also serve to dampen her experience of the few pleasures	she	unwittingly	stumbles	upon.	Not	only is the	best life for	Maud	one in which she has	more pleasure, the best life is one in	which she changes herself in ways that make it possible for her to experience much more pleasure than her current	attitudes	allow.	Thus	if	hedonism	is	true	it	may	well	be	that	the	best	choice 34	The	example	is	borrowed	from	Fletcher	(2016:	67-8). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 22 for	Maud	now	is	to	begin	the	process	of	altering	her	religious	beliefs.	She	need	not abandon religion. But she needs a religious view that (unlike her current one) encourages	pleasure.	The	internalist	question	is	whether	we	can	expect	Maud	to	be motivated	now	by	knowledge	of	the	descriptive	facts	about	how	much	pleasure	she could experience if only she changed her beliefs. Is it likely that she would be motivated	to	make	such	a	choice?	Absolutely	not!	From	her	current	position	she	has zero	motivation	to	change. Of course, for all I have said so far, the problem could be a problem	with hedonism	rather	than	motivational	internalism	about	potential	good.	If	hedonism	is false,	then	it	will	not	be	surprising	if	someone	is	not	motivated	by	knowledge	of	facts about	how	she	could	change	to	maximize	her	experience	of	pleasure.	However,	the problem	arises	for	other	views	as	well.	To	see	this,	consider	the	next	example. Consider Miserable Martha. Martha is not always miserable, but she does suffer	from	regular	bouts	of	serious	uni-polar	depression,	and	when	in	the	grips	of these spells she is	miserable.	When she is not depressed she is quite artistic. She strongly	suspects	that	part	of	what	contributes	to	the	quality	of	her	art	is	something she	gains	from	her	depressive	spells.	Suppose	she	is	right.	And	suppose	she	has	the following option: she could take a medication that would relieve her of her depressions,	but	it	would	also	alter	slightly	her	personality.	She	would	be	capable	of living	a	wonderful	life	as	the	person	she	would	become,	but	she	would	not	be	nearly as creative and the quality of her artwork	would be significantly less. She could, however, have healthy relationships that are currently impossible given her recurrent depressions. And she could succeed in many other, equally gratifying, though	non-artistic	pursuits.	Here	I	assume	a	pluralistic	view	of	welfare	that	allows for	many	different	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	goods,	including	creative	production	of art,	other	kinds	of	achievement,	and	relationships. Suppose the best possible continuation of Martha's life-the one with the greatest net positive intrinsic prudential value-is one of the lives she could lead only	with	the	medication.	This	means	she	has	most	reason	right	now	to	give	up	her artistic	pursuits,	take	the	medication,	and	embark	on	a	highly	different	path	through life. Should we assume that the person she is now-during one of her nonPublished	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 23 depressed	moments-would	be	motivated	by	knowledge	of	these	facts?	Again,	recall that	what	she	knows	are	just	the	descriptive	facts	about	what	her	life	will	have	in	it and	what	it	will	be	like	for	her	once	she	becomes	the	post-medication	person.	Will knowledge	of	such	facts	necessarily	motivate	her	to	choose	the	medication?	It	seems clear	to	me	that	we	cannot	expect	this.	Indeed,	it	is	quite	likely	that	the	facts	won't motivate her at all, particularly if from her current position she can't personally identify	with	the	individual	she	would	become	if	she	pursued	that	path. I	don't	think	this	is	a	problem.	We	shouldn't	really	expect	her	to	be	motivated by facts about her potential good that are so removed from her current circumstances. The prudential goodness facts sometimes point in directions that, from	our	limited,	current	perspectives,	seem	odd.	It	may	just	be	that	the	complexity of	future	prudential	value	ensures	that	we	cannot	always	care	about	our	future	good from afar. Motivational externalism about potential good begins to seem like the sensible	option. §3.1	Two-Tier	Internalism? Before we settle for SC3, we should examine carefully the view of Connie Rosati, labeled "two-tier internalism."35	To-date this is the most well-developed alternative	to	my	view. To	grasp	two-tier	internalism	we	need	a	couple	of	definitions.	First,	we	need the notion of "ordinary optimal conditions." These are just the conditions of judgment	most of us occupy	most of the time. They exclude the obvious sorts of conditions	that	distort	judgment	(or	make	it	impossible)-things	like	being	asleep, being	drunk,	being	delusional,	being	in	a	state	of	intense	emotion,	or	being	clinically depressed.36 Second	we	need the	notion	of "ideally	authoritative conditions."	This is the idea	of	conditions	that	improve	judgment	to	the	point	where	it	can't	go	wrong	and which	are	authoritative	for	that	reason.	Most	of	us	realize	our	ordinary judgments 35	Rosati	(1996:	307).	Alexander	Sarch	(2011)	argues	against	Rosati's	two-tier	internalism.	However, he does not contemplate the possibility of an internalist constraint on realized good like the one defended	here. 36	Rosati	(1996:	304-5). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 24 are hampered by various limitations.	We lack knowledge.	We are prone to	many forms	of	irrationality.	Thus,	it	is	natural	to	suppose	that	if	we	had	full	knowledge,	or could be always rational our judgments	would presumably be	much better. If	we push such ideas to the limit we arrive at the notion of ideally authoritative conditions-the	set	of	epistemic	conditions	that	are	ideally	authoritative	for	making judgments	about	prudential	value.37	I	shall	refer	to	these	conditions	as	C*. We can now explain two-tier internalism as follows. Consider a case of potential	good	(as	we	shall	see	it	works	the	same	way	for	realized	good).	Facts	about potential good can typically be translated into claims about good choices in the present.	So,	suppose	it	is	true	that	Y	is	the	best	choice	for	S	now. Speaking roughly, two-tier internalism requires first that S herself under ideally	authoritative	conditions	recognize	this	fact	about	her	good	(that	Y	is	the	best choice). For various reasons the actual requirement needs to be formulated in a slightly more complicated way as follows: It must be true that in C* if S contemplates	the	situation	of	her	actual	self	as	someone	about	to	assume	the	actual self's	position,	she	would	want	her	actual	self	to	choose	Y.38 The second requirement of two-tier internalism is that under ordinary optimal	conditions	a	person,	S,	cares	about	what	she	would	want	in	C*.	This	means that	even if in	ordinary	circumstances she	can't recognize facts	about	her	good	as facts	about	her	good	(and	so	can't	be	motivated	by	them),	she	still	cares	at	that	time about	what	her	ideal	self	would	want	in	C*.	Of	course,	presently	she	can't	make the connection	between	what is really	good for	her (Y)	and	what the ideal self	would want in C*. But the fact that right now she cares about	what her ideal self	would want in	C*	means	that if	she	could	make	the	connection-if	she	could	come	to	see that Y is what the ideal self would want in C*, she would right now have some motivation	to	pursue	Y. 37	Rosati	(1996:	304). 38	For	ease	of	exposition,	I	often	leave	out	these	details,	but	they	should	always	be	understood	to	be present.	I	sometimes	use	short	phrases	like	"what	S	would	want	in	C*"	to	stand	in	for	longer	phrases of	the	sort:	"what	S	would	want	in	C*	for	her	actual	self	if	she	were	contemplating	the	circumstances of	her	actual	self	as	someone	about	to	assume	the	actual	self's	position." Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 25 Rosati clearly intends two-tier internalism to serve	as a constraint	on	both facts about realized prudential good and facts about	potential prudential good. In other	words,	she	does	not	make	the	modal	distinction	that	has	been	central to	my discussion	so	far.	For	that	reason,	let	us	briefly	consider	in	turn,	two-tier	internalism as	a	constraint	on	realized	good,	and	then	as	a	constraint	on	possible	good. Rosati and I agree that there is an internalist constraint on facts about current	realized	intrinsic	good-that	there	must	be	some	kind	of	psychological	link between	a subject	and facts	about	what is	good for	her	now.	We	simply	offer two different accounts of what that constraint is. Like SC3, Rosati's constraint is best understood as a necessary condition only. Although two-tier internalism and SC3 are	naturally	understood	as	competing	accounts	of	a	single	constraint	on	facts	about realized good, nothing rules out in advance the possibility that there are two constraints. This	turns	out	to	be	relevant	in	the	following	way.	It	is	incredibly	difficult	to undermine	the	two-tier	internalist	requirement	for	realized	good	directly.	To	do	so we	would	need	to	have	a	clear	case	in	which	we	could	all	agree	that	something,	X,	is currently good for a subject, S. And	we	would then need to establish in that case two-tier internalism fails to hold. That would decisively show that the two-tier constraint	is	not	necessary,	as	claimed.	However,	for	various	reasons,	it	is	incredibly difficult	to	know	in	any	given	case	whether	or	not	two-tier	internalism	is	satisfied. So	rather	than	undermine	it	directly,	my	aim	is	to	show	its	irrelevance. First, it	seems	to	me	that	no	matter	what	the	status	of	two-tier internalism, we still need SC3 in the case of realized goodness facts. Suppose, for example, a theory	were	to	say	that	writing	is	intrinsically	good	for	Samia	at	the	very	time	when she is so utterly indifferent to it. I confess, I simply can't imagine anything that would	convince	me	to	view	something	as	intrinsically	good	for	her	at	that	time	given the	psychological	facts	about	her	at	that	time.	So	SC3	remains	necessary.	Second,	it seems	important	to	note	that	one	of	the	prime	motivations	for	two-tier	internalism fails in the case of realized goodness. Two-tier internalism was formulated in response to worries about the ability of a subject to recognize and positively respond to facts about her own good. It is designed to provide a kind of indirect Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 26 psychological	link	in	cases	where	a	direct	link	is	lacking.	But	once	we	make	the	modal distinction,	and	recognize	the	importance	of	SC3	for	facts	about	realized	goodness, we also see that indirect links are not needed, because direct links (currently existing	links)	are	required.	SC3	rejects	any	theory	where	they	are	absent.	In	other words,	once	we	focus	narrowly	on	facts	about	realized	good,	we	see	that	there	are no	cases	in	which	X	is	currently	good	for	S,	S	is	aware	of	X,	but	S	as	she	actually	is fails	to	respond	positively	to	X	in	any	way.	But	since	no	such	facts	exist,	there	is	no need	to	salvage	internalism	for	these	cases	by	forging	an	indirect	link	through	facts about	what	S	would	want	in	C*. Nonetheless, one might think that we need something like the two-tier requirement when we focus on facts about possible good. It is unlikely that any theory	of	welfare	will	be	able	to	ensure	that	agents	are	always	reliably	motivated	to pursue	what	would	be	best	for	them.	But	one	might	hope	that	two-tier	internalism could forge an indirect link between the facts about	potential individual good and the	subject's	current	motivations. Consider	again	Miserable	Martha	for	whom	(let	us	assume)	the	best	choice	is medication and self-transformation. If the two-tier requirement is satisfied, this means	both	(a) that in	C*	Martha	would	want	her	actual	self to	adopt the life that medication	makes	possible,	and	(b)	right	now	(assuming	she	is	not	currently	in	the grips	of	depression)	Martha	cares	about	what	her ideal	self	would	want in	C*.	The question is	whether the	best theory	of	welfare can ensure	both that	Martha in	C* wants the right things	and that actual	Martha cares	about the	desires	of	her ideal self.	To	put the	point	more	dramatically, should	we reject a theory	of	welfare if it fails	to	ensure	these	two	claims?	I	think	not. There	are	several	reasons	for	this,	though	I	grant	that	the	first	reason	is	not widely	shared.	I	am	skeptical	of	the	idea	that	we	can	describe	a	set	of	ideal	epistemic conditions	that	could	be	occupied	by	a	real	human	being	and	would	reliably	reveal to this	human	occupant	all the truths	about	her	good.39	In	other	words	even if	we make	sense	of	the	idea	of	an	agent	who	is	fully	informed	and	fully	rational,	I	have	no 39	Similar	skepticism	is	expressed	by	Sobel	(1994)	and	Rosati	(1995). Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 27 faith that the pronouncements of such an idealized self would really track the goodness	facts.	I	am	not	sure	we	should	trust	the	pronouncements	of	such	a	self.	Nor do	I	think	there	is	some	way	to	amend	the	description	of	ideal	conditions	to	fix	the problem. This is the basis for my skepticism about full information theories of prudential good. But it is relevant to the question of whether to accept two-tier internalism, for although it is not a theory of prudential value, it is a proposed constraint	on	such	theories.	If	there	is	no	C*	such	that	the	pronouncements	from	C* are always correct, then we cannot require a theory of welfare to conform to a restriction	that	appeals	to	C*. However,	even	if	one	does	not	share	my	skepticism	about	C*,	it	is	possible	to raise	worries	about	two-tier	internalism.	Two-tier	internalism	assumes	that	there	is some	description	of	ideal	conditions	C*	such	that	C*	satisfies	two	requirements.	On the	one	hand,	C*	is	such	that	all	welfare	agents	view	C*	as	authoritative	(this	is	what underwrites	the	confidence	that	under	ordinary	optimal	conditions	agents	will	care about	what their ideal selves	want in C*). And on the other hand, C* is such that agents	in	C*	reliably	perceive	the	goodness	facts	(or	at	least	reliably	want	for	their non-ideal	selves	the	things	that	are	really	good).	The	problem,	however,	is	that	there may	be	no	C*	that	can	satisfy	both	conditions. Suppose for the sake	of argument that there is some set of ideal epistemic conditions	C*	such	that	an	agent in	these	conditions	reliably judges	her	own	good. Still, actual	agents	do	not	all	agree	about	what these	conditions	are.	Probably it is true	for	the	vast	majority	of	people	that	there	is	some	description	or	other	of	better epistemic	conditions they	would	accept	as	authoritative.	Let	us	call the	conditions accepted by	Martha C+Martha, and the ones accepted by	Maud C+Maud., and for each person the conditions she would view as authoritative are C+hername. In ordinary optimal conditions	Martha cares	what she	would	want in C+Martha and	Maud cares what she	would	want in C+Maud. But unless C+Martha is the same as C* this	will not forge a motivational link with the true goodness facts. In short, if people do not generally	agree	about	ideally	authoritative	conditions,	then	even	if	there	is	a	C*	that offers a reliable epistemic perspective on the	prudential goodness facts, it	will be impossible	to	establish	an	indirect	motivational	link	from	individuals	to	those	facts. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 28 It is important to remember that	many	people, even	when they are free	of violent	emotion,	are	not	delusional,	and	so	on,	are	willing	to	grant	authority	to	less than ideal judgments-judgments made without full information or that are irrational	in	one	or	another	sense.	Nor	can	they	all	easily	be	brought	to	see	the	error of their	epistemic	ways.	Even if	very	many	people	can,	we	have to	remember that internalism is supposedly a necessary condition. My point is just that there is no value	for	C*	such	that	C*	offers	the	right	kind	of	perspective	on	the	goodness	facts and	C*	is	viewed	as	authoritative	by	all	people	in	ordinary	optimal	conditions.	In	the very	best	case	the	link	remains	highly	contingent.	Therefore	we	should	not	require	a theory	of	welfare	to	satisfy	the	two-tier	internalism	requirement. Accepting motivational externalism about potential good might be more distressing	if	we	were	also	externalists	about	realized	good.	To	embrace	a	dual	form of	externalism	would	be	to	accept	that	the	psychology	of	individual	subjects	places no necessary constraint on prudential goodness facts. That does seem deeply problematic. Since	most theorists until now have not distinguished realized good and potential good and so have not considered	whether the constraints for each might	be	different, it is	easy	to	see	why	a	claim	like	two-tier internalism	would	be popular. But after reflection it seems that it just isn't necessary. The right link between	the	psychology	of	agents	and	goodness	facts	is	a	link	that	holds	when	basic, intrinsic	goodness	is	realized.	And	once	we	see	that,	we	see	we	have	all	we	need. §4 Conclusion We	have covered	a lot of ground. I first reviewed	my	understanding	of the "structure of good," emphasizing a modal distinction between realized intrinsic prudential	goods	and	merely	potential	good. Against this backdrop I argued that we should understand existence internalism for prudential value as a constraint on realized intrinsic good. In an attempt-at	least	for	now-to	keep	the	formulation	of	the	constraint	broad	so	that many	theories	might	satisfy	it,	I	proposed	the	following	formulation: Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 29 SC3:	A	necessary	condition	on	something,	X,	being	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good for	a	subject,	S,	at	a	time	T,	is	that: (1) If	S	is	aware	of	X	at	T,	S	must	either	have	a	positive	response	to	X	at	T,	or	S must	have	an	on-going	positive	engagement	with	X	that	still	holds	at	T,	or (2) If S is unaware	of	X at	T, it	must	be true that S	would	have	had a	positive response	to	X	at	T	if	she	had	been	aware	of	X	at	T. This	is	a	merely	necessary	constraint.	Positive	response	should	be	taken	to	include	a wide	range	of	positive	psychological	states. Having	defended	SC3	I	considered	whether	we	should	also	want	some	form of	internalism	constraint	that	would	guarantee	that	subjects	are	motivated,	at	least to	some	degree,	by	truths	about	their	own	potential	good.	We	should	not.	We	should accept motivational externalism about potential good. Individuals will not necessarily	be	motivated	to	seek	their	good,	but	if	they	seek	it,	and	get	it,	they	will respond	positively	to	it. Finally,	I	considered	and	rejected	two-tier	internalism,	a	highly	sophisticated attempt to forge an indirect link between prudential goodness facts and an individual's	motivations.	SC3	is	superior	to	two-tier internalism	when	we	focus	on facts	about	realized	goodness.	And	in	the	case	of	potential	good	it	is	ultimately	wiser to	accept	that	no	internalist	constraint,	even	an	indirect	one,	can	be	had. References Adams,	Robert	Merrihew.	1999.	Finite	and	Infinite	Goods.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. Arneson,	Richard.	1999.	"Human	Flourishing	versus	Desire	Satisfaction,"	Social Policy	and	Philosophy	16(1):	113-142. Brink,	David	O.	1989. Moral	Realism	and	the	Foundations	of	Ethics.	New	York: Cambridge	University	Press. ----	2008.	"The	Significance	of	Desire,"	in	Russ	Shafer-Landau	ed. Oxford Studies	in	Metaethics,	Vol.	III,	5-45. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 30 Crisp,	Roger.	2006.	"Hedonism	Reconsidered,"	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological Research,	73(3):	619-645. Darwall,	Stephen.	1983. Impartial	Reason.	Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press. ---	2002. Welfare	and	Rational	Care.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press. Dorsey,	Dale.	2015.	"The	Significance	of	a	Life's	Shape,"	Ethics,	125:	303-330. ---	(2017).	"Why	Should	Welfare	'Fit'?"	Philosophical	Quarterly	67:	685-708. Feldman,	Fred.	2000.	"Basic	Intrinsic	Value,"	Philosophical	Studies,	99:	319-346. Fletcher,	Guy.	2013.	"A	Fresh	Start	for	the	Objective	List	Theory	of	Well-Being," Utilitas,	25(2):	206-220. ----	2016.	The	Philosophy	of	Well-Being:	An	Introduction.	New	York:	Routledge. Glasgow,	Joshua.	2013.	"The	Shape	of	a	Life	and	the	Value	of	Loss	and	Gain," Philosophical	Studies,	162:	665-682. Hall,	Alicia	and	Valerie	Tiberius.	2016.	"Well-Being	and	Subject	Dependence,"	in	Guy Fletcher	ed.	The	Routledge	Handbook	of	Philosophy	of	Well-Being,	175-186. New	York:	Routledge. Hawkins,	Jennifer.	2014.	"Well-Being,	Time,	and	Dementia,"	Ethics,	124:	507-542. Heathwood,	Chris.	2006.	"Desire	Satisfactionism	and	Hedonism,"	Philosophical Studies,	128:	539-563. ----	2007.	"The	Reduction	of	Sensory	Pleasure	to	Desire,"	Philosophical	Studies, 133:	23-44. ----2017.	"What	Is	the	Resonance	Constraint?"	(unpublished	manuscript). Kagan,	Shelly.	1998.	"Rethinking	Intrinsic	Value,"	The	Journal	of	Ethics,	2	(4):	277- 297. ----	2009.	"Well-Being	As	Enjoying	the	Good,"	in	"Philosophical	Perspectives," suppl.,	Nous	23:	253-272. Korsgaard,	Christine.	1983.	"Two	Distinctions	in	Goodness,"	The	Philosophical Review,	92	(2):	169-195. Moore,	G.	E.	1903. Principia	Ethica. Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Nagel,	Thomas.	1970.	"Death,"	Nous	4(1):	73-80. Parfit,	Derek.	1984.	Reasons	and	Persons.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Railton,	Peter.	1986a.	"Facts	and	Values,"	Philosophical	Topics,	14:	5-31. Published	in:	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	Volume	14.	Edited	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau.	Oxford University	Press	(2019). 31 ----	1986b.	"Moral	Realism,"	The	Philosophical	Review,	95	(2):	163-207. Rosati,	Connie.	1995.	"Persons,	Perspectives	and	Full	Information	Accounts	of	the Good,"	Ethics,	105	(2):	296-325. ----	1996.	"Internalism	and	the	Good	for	a	Person,"	Ethics,	106	(2):	297-326. ----	2006.	"Personal	Good,"	in	T.	Horgan,	M.	Timmons	(eds),	Metaethics	after Moore,	107-132.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. ----	2016. "Moral	Motivation",	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy (Winter	2016	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	=	<https://plato.stanford. edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-motivation/>. Sarch,	Alexander.	2011.	"Internalism	About	a	Person's	Good:	Don't	Believe	It," Philosophical	Studies,	154:	161-184. Scanlon,	T.	M.	1998.	What	We	Owe	to	Each	Other.	Cambridge,	Ma.:	Harvard	Belknap Press. Sidgwick,	Henry.	1907.	The	Methods	of	Ethics,	7th	edition.	New	York:	Hackett. Slote,	Michael.	1984.	"Goods	and	Lives,"	in	Goods	and	Virtues,	9-37.	Oxford:	Oxford University	Press. Smith,	Michael.	1994.	The	Moral	Problem.	Cambridge,	Ma.:	Blackwell. Smuts,	Aaron.	2011.	"The	Feels	Good	Theory	of	Pleasure,"	Philosophical	Studies,	155 (2):	241-265. Sobel,	David.	1994.	"Full	Information	Accounts	of	Well-Being,"	Ethics,	104:	784-810. Sumner,	L.	W.	1996.	Welfare,	Happiness	and	Ethics.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Temkin,	Larry.	2012.	Rethinking	the	Good.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Van	Roojen,	Mark.	2015.	Metaethics:	A	Contemporary	Introduction.	New	York,	NY: Routledge. Velleman,	J.	David.	1991.	"Well-Being	and	Time,"	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly,	72:	48-77. ----	2000.	"Is	Motivation	Internal	to	Value?	in	The	Possibility	of	Practical Reason.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Zimmerman,	Michael	J.	2015. "Intrinsic	vs.	Extrinsic	Value",	The	Stanford Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Spring	2015	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.), URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/value-intrinsic- extrinsic